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73-25 1 6. Parol evidence of contents of writings - "IV lien 
admissible. 
There can be no evidence of the contents of a writing, other than the writing 
itself, except in the following cases: 
(1) when the original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of 
the loss or destruction must first be made. 
(2) when the original is in the possession of the party against whom the 
evidence is offered and he fails to produce it after reasonable notice. 
(3) when the original is a record or other document in the custody of a 
public officer. 
(4) when the original has been recorded, and the record or a certified 
copy thereof is made evidence by this code or other statute. 
(5) when the original consists of numerous accounts or other docu-
ments which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and 
the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the whole. 
Provided, however, if any business, institution, member of a profession or 
calling, or any department or agency of government, in the regular course of 
business or activity has kept or recorded any memorandum, writing, entry, 
print, representation or combination thereof, of any act, transaction, occur-
rence or event, and in the regular course of business has caused any or all of 
the same to be recorded, copied or reproduced by any photographic, photo-
static, microfilm, micro-card, miniature photographic, or other process which 
accurately reproduces or forms a durable medium for so reproducing the origi-
nal, the original may be destroyed in the regular course of business unless its 
preservation is required by law; and such reproduction, when satisfactorily 
identified, is as admissible in evidence as the original itself in any judicial or 
administrative proceeding whether the original is in existence or not, an 
enlargement or facsimile of such reproduction is likewise admissible in evi-
dence if the original reproduction is in existence and available for inspection 
under direction of court. The introduction of a reproduced record, enlargement 
or facsimile, does not preclude admission of the original. 
In the cases mentioned in Subdivisions (3) and (4), a copy of the original, or 
of the record, must be produced; in those mentioned in Subdivisions (1) and 
(2), either a copy or oral evidence of the contents. 
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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Where the facts are called to its attention, may the Court 
of Appeals base an affirmance on a finding of the District Court 
unsupported by any evidence in the record? 
2. Can the testimony of counsel for an optionee that he believ-
ed, withou t comrn 1 inica t i on w:i t h op t i oner s oi i !: 1:ie si Ib j ec t or any under-
standing of their intentions, that the statement of consideration in 
an option ("$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration") was 
"shorthand" £or something undisclosed, a 1 oi Ie create sueh ambiguity in 
the option as to permit resort to parol evidence to discover alter-
native consideration for the option: 
a; where there is no the evidence that the optioners 
understood the phrase "$5,000.00" to represent anything except 
$5, -
b. where enforcement of the option without requiring pay-
ment of the consideration stated in the option destroys the tax 
e f f e c 1: s a ci rn i 1 1 e d ] v i r I 1: e n d e d f o i: 1:1 I e I: i: a n s a c t i o n s ? 
3. Are copies of documents written by a central witness admiss-
ible on the ground of impeachment of the witness, where 
a. portions of the documents have been om:i 11eci in copying 
them, the missing portions cannot be supplied, and the documents 
are unintelligible without them; 
b. all of the documents are fragmentary and partially 
illegible; 
c. there is no evidence that the documents were composed 
on the same occasion(s), or are otherwise related to one another; 
cL it is impossible to identify ti le persoi i(s) speaking in 
the documents; 
e. counsel has staple! tr--- iocuments together in the 
manner thought to be most suggestive, but without evidence that 
they belong together in that manner; 
f. • the meaning claimed to inhere in the documents is not 
merely cumulative of other evidence about that witness, but is 
purported to contain hearsay confessions of other parties; and 
g. the documents were not produced as required by a pre-
trial order? 
4. May interest * • * . deoor- \ • *- -\ * -nf-ni-: specific enforce-
ment of an agreement to convey realty be awarded to a buyer who has 
had use and possession of the realty throughout.? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals is found at 7 5 Utah Advance 
Reports 59. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The decision of the Court of Appeal, \-i- entered February 10, 
1988. Rehearing was denied March 14, y .-».< . 
Jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Couri + o review the decision is 
confirmed by §78-2-2 and §78-2a-4, * : •-i- M . (1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for specific performance of an option to buy 
land. The District Court decreed specific enforcement and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. The essential facts are as follows: 
In the Fall of 1981, William Colman approached defendants Archer 
and Wolfe seeking a loan of $750,000.00 to be used in a project 
extracting minerals from brine in Nevada. Archer and Wolfe refused. 
Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 417; Vol. IV, pp. 535-537; Vol. V, pp. 731-732. 
Subsequently, Colman offered to sell Archer and Wolfe a limited part-
nership interest in the brine project for $250,000.00, and a ranch in 
Cache County, Utah, for a further $250,000.00. Archer and Wolfe 
agreed. Tr. Vol. I, p. 10 et seq.; Vol. Ill, p. 419 et seq.; Vol. IV, 
p. 537; Vol. V, pg. 731 et seq.; Vol. Ill, pp. 423-428; Vol. IV, pp. 
239 et seq., 539; Vol V. pp. 734-740. Colman then asked for a one 
year option to re-purchase the ranch. Archer and Wolfe agreed. Tr. 
Vol. I, pp. 739, 746; Vol. Ill, p. 430 et seq.; Vol. IV, p. 541; Vol. 
V, pp. 764-765. Subsequently, the one year option was extended to a 
one and one-half year option. Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 449 et seq.; Vol. IV, 
pp. 563-564; Vol. V, p. 760 et seq. The consideration stated for the 
option was "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration". The 
option was purposefully given a date ("March , 1982") several 
months after the deed to the ranch was delivered, though both docu-
ments were signed at once. Tr. Vol. V, pp. 764-765. 
Colman had his attorney, Frank Allen, prepare the documents. 
Allen testified that he took no part in the negotiation of the terms 
of any of the documents (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-95), and could be sure 
only that he received instructions on their preparation from Colman. 
Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49, 63. In particular, he never communicated 
with the parties about the $5,000.00 consideration expressed for the 
option. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-155. Moreover, he made no attempt to 
understand, and did not understand the purposes of the defendants in 
structuring the transactions as they did (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 94-95), 
though he understood that some tax benefits were thought to accrue 
from that structure. 
Allen prepared, and the parties executed, a certificate of limit-
ed partnership requiring certain expenditures and certain royalties in 
exchange for $250,000.00, an agreement for purchase of real property 
and a deed transferring the ranch for $250,000.00, and the option. 
When the option became operable in March, 1982, Archer and Wolfe 
sought the $5,000.00 consideration. Tr. Vol. Ill, pp. 467-474; Vol. 
IV, pp. 574-589; Vol. V, pp. 768-770. Colman did not pay it. Id. 
The demand was repeated a number of times thereafter, but the 
$5,000.00 was never paid. Id. Finally, Archer and Wolfe advised 
Colman that if the $5,000.00 was not paid, the option would be regard-
ed as invalid. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 589. 
Colman testified that when the documents were executed, he be-
lieved that the $5,000.00 for the option had to be paid. Tr. Vol. IV, 
pp. 570-572, 587. Later, when the $5,000.00 was demanded and he 
didn't have it, he asked Frank Allen if it had to be paid. Tr. Vol. 
IV, p. 578. Allen testified that in response to that inquiry he told 
Colman that he, Allen, had inserted the $5,000.00 in the option as a 
quantification of benefits, particularly over-riding royalties ex-
pressed in the limited partnership agreement, to be received by Archer 
and Wolfe, and that the $5,000.00 didn't have to be paid. Tr. Vol. 
VI, pp. 1006-1007. 
Upon cross-exmamination, however, Allen conceded that he had 
never discussed his idea about the $5,000.00 with any of the parties 
at the time of execution of the documents, nor had they discussed 
their ideas about it with him; that, in fact, he had no way of knowing 
what they thought about it, and that they might have decided on the 
$5,000.00 for some purpose wholly unknown to him. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 
154-155; Vol. VI, pp. 1012-1013. Archer, Wolfe and Colman testified 
that the $5,000.00 was negotiated and agreed upon as the price for 
extending the option from 1 year to lh years. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 564-
567; Vol. Ill, pp. 450-454; Vol. V, pp. 760-762. 
Subsequently, Colman assigned the option to plaintiff Miller. 
Archer and Wolfe immediately upon being notified of the assignment, 
notified Miller that the $5,000.00 had never been paid, and that 
unless it was paid the option would be considered invalid. Tr. Vol. 
II, pp. 311-312, 322. 
Miller did not pay the $5,000.00. Instead, he approached Allen 
and Colman for affidavits that the $5,000.00 did not need to be paid. 
Allen prepared such affidavits, and they were signed by Allen and 
Colman, though Colman testified that he signed the document at Allen's 
instruction without reading it. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 598-599. 
Several months thereafter, Archer and Wolfe advised Miller that 
the option was withdrawn because the $5,000.00 had not been paid. Tr. 
Vol. II, p. 322. Miller thereafter sought to exercise the option, and 
suit followed. 
At trial, the District Court over objection admitted parol evi-
dence on the issue of whether the $5,000.00 was due. By way of 
impeachment of Colman, plaintiff offered, and the District Court 
admitted, a series of copies of irregularly shaped pieces of paper 
bearing Colman's handwriting (Exhibits 54, 55, 56). The documents had 
been poorly copied, were incomplete and illegible, and had been re-
constructed by counsel in the form he thought most suggestive. Colman 
could not identify the documents except as possible notes of a conver-
sation with plaintifffs counsel. Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945 et seq. The 
condition of the documents could not be explained by counsel, nor 
could he assure the court that they were in the same condition as when 
received from Colman. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 1107-1120, 1144-1161. Defend-
ants objected to the documents as hearsay, and to their admission as 
in violation of Ev. Rule 106. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 693-695; Vol. VI, pp. 
1113-1117 
Ultimately, the District Court determined that the $5,000.00 was 
not required to be paid, on the basis that Frank Allen's testimony was 
more credible than William Colman's. Finding of Fact No. 32, 33. The 
District Court found that "the real consideration for the Option 
consisted of the 'other good and valuable consideration', which in-
cluded the conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed 
from Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the 
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited Partnership 
benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding royalty, and the 
various tax benefits occurring to the Defendants by structuring the 
total transaction their way". Finding of Fact No. 21. 
The Court of Appeals also resolved the matter by resolving the 
conflict in the testimony of Allen and Colman in favor of Allen, and 
observed that "the trial court looked at the substance of the parties1 
entire dealings and found that the structuring of the total commit-
ments was the intended consideration for the Option. We cannot say 
this was error." Opinion, p. 5. 
ARGUMENT 
Questions 1 and 2: 
An option not supported by separate consideration is an offer 
which may be withdrawn at any time. Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793 
(Utah 1975); Fitzgerald v^ Boyle, 193 Pac. 1109 (Utah 1920). If the 
option in this case was not supported by some agreed upon considera-
tion, other than the $5,000.00 expressed in it which was not paid, it 
was properly withdrawn and could not be enforced. 
With respect to an alternative consideration for the option, the 
Court of Appeals concluded as follows: 
"This is substantial evidence to support the trial court's con-
clusion that the recital of '$5,000.00 and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged1 in the 
Option was nominal consideration inserted by the drafter of the agree-
ment for convenience as the parties did not wish to reveal in writing 
the true consideration for the deal... Allen testified that he had 
consistently informed the parties that he had inserted the $5,000.00 
amount on his own, intending it as a legal shorthand for the true 
consideration, and it was not an item for which the parties bar-
gained... The trial court looked at the substance of the parties1 
entire dealings and found that the structuring of the total commit-
ments was the intended consideration for the Option. We cannot say 
this was error." Opinion, pp. 4-5. 
These holdings require review because: 
1. Despite appellants1 protests, the Court of Appeals declined 
to review the transcript to observe that the alleged testimony of 
Frank Allen relied upon to constitute "substantial evidence" in sup-
port of the District Court's ruling, that Allen advised defendants 
that "$5,000.00" was inserted in the Option as shorthand for something 
else, and that he had knowledge of negotiations of the parties re-
specting consideration for the option, was never given. That is, the 
testimony relied upon by the Court of Appeals as the "substantial 
evidence" in support of the ruling does not exist, and the decision 
violates the basic requirement that judgments be supported by find-
ings, and findings by substantial evidence. 
2. Lacking such testimony, there was no evidentiary basis for 
imputing to defendants Frank Allen's idea that "$5,000.00 and other 
good and valuable consideration" was shorthand for something else, and 
there was no ambiguity in the Option to be explained. The admission 
of evidence of alternative considerations for the option was not by 
way of explaining an ambiguity, but merely varied the terms of the 
document. 
The actual finding of the District in this regard was that 
"The real consideration for the Option consisted of the 
'other good and valuable consideration', which included the 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed 
from Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid 
for the Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the 
Limited Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the 
overriding royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing 
to the Defendants by structuring the total transaction 
their way." District Court Finding of Fact No. 21. 
Rather than finding that "the structuring of the total commitments was 
the intended consideration for the Option", the District Court simply 
plucked the contractual considerations out of other integrated agree-
ments, the limited partnership agreement and the real estate contract, 
and inserted them in the Option. This process not only altered the 
terms of the option, but of the other agreements, in violation of the 
parol evidence rule, and precedents of the Utah Supreme Court inter-
preting it. 
3. The holding that there was "substantial evidence" of alter-
native consideration for the option converted the sale and option of 
the realty into "the functional equivalent of a loan" (District Court 
Finding of Fact No. 31), erasing the tax benefits for which the sale 
and option structure admittedly was chosen. Precedents of the Supreme 
Court forbid the admission of parol which alters the bargained-for 
effect of the documents, and require clear and convincing evidence 
that both parties regarded deeds absolute on their face as security 
instruments. Paloni v. Beebe, 110 P.2d 563 (Utah 1941); Wood v. 
Roberts, 586 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978); Corey v. Roberts, 25 P.2d 940, 942, 
947 (Utah 1933); Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 13 P.2d 436 (Utah 1932); 
Kjar v. Brimley, 27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23 (Utah 1972). 
The Court of Appeals concluded that if it were shown that the 
phrase "$5,000.00 and other good and valuable consideration" were a 
statement of "nominal consideration" mere shorthand for something 
else, not a requirement that $5,000.00 be paid, and if it could be 
shown further that the three agreements executed by the parties - the 
limited partnership agreement, the real estate sales contract, and the 
option - were in fact one contract, the considerations stated in the 
limited partnership agreement and real estate sales contract could 
provide consideration for the option. 
"$5,000.00", however, is neither nominal nor ambiguous, and a 
claim that there was, in addition, some "other good and valuable 
consideration" would not excuse the failure to pay the $5,000.00. 
Luther v. Nat11 Bank of Commerce, 98 P.2d 667 (Wash. 1940); U.S. v. 
Schaefer, 319 F.2d 907 (9 Cir. 1963). The possibility of ambiguity in 
this case was created only by the acknowledgment of receipt of 
$5,000.00 where no money was delivered. That is, the acknowledgment 
might not be regarded as a simple misstatement of fact; it could be 
regarded as raising a question whether the phrase "$5,000.00" might 
represent something of that value not money. To show the latter, 
however, required evidence that defendants, at the time of making the 
agreements, entertained the notion that "$5,000.00" could stand for 
something else. The evidence on this point that the Court of Appeals 
thought existed in this record does not exist. The question, there-
fore, what alternative consideration for the option might have been 
should never have been reached. — That is, to show that there was a 
latent ambiguity in the option, it was necessary to show that the 
parties, including defendants, regarded the otherwise unambiguous 
phrase "$5,000.00" as representing something else. There was no such 
evidence, and therefore no ambiguity justifying a parol search for 
alternative considerations. 
— Frank Allen's testimony was that he was not privy to the 
negotiations for the agreements (Trial Transcript, Vol. I, pp. 43, 93-
95), that he could only be sure that he received instructions on 
preparation of the documents from Colman (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 44-45, 49, 
63), that he had no contemporaneous communication with the parties on 
the subject of the consideration for the option (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 154-
155), that the parties might have agreed on payment of the $5,000.00 
for the option without his knowing it (Tr. Vol. II, p. 158), and that 
when the question of payment of the $5,000.00 arose after execution of 
the documents he told Colman his view that it did not have to be paid 
(Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 1006-1008). Allen never testified that he expressed 
such a view to Archer or Wolfe, or they to him. What Allen, not a 
party to the agreements, concluded separate and apart from Archer and 
Wolfe and without knowing what they thought on the subject, was irrel-
evant, and should not have been admitted. 
Colman's testimony, consistent with Archer and Wolfe's, was that 
he negotiated with them and agreed to pay the $5,000.00 for the option 
outside Allen1s presence. Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 556, 564-569. Colman also 
signed an affidavit, on Allen's advice, stating that the $5,000.00 was 
"window dressing" not intended to be paid. The finding, therefore, 
that Allen's testimony was more credible than Colman's indicates 
nothing about the intentions of Archer and Wolfe. 
The effect of eliminating a separate consideration for the op-
tion, according to the District Court, was to render the sale-option 
transaction "the functional equivalent 'of a loan", and the deed given, 
in effect, a mortgage. It is undisputed that defendants refused to 
make a loan or take a mortgage because that would result in tax 
treatment of proceeds of the reconveyance as ordinary income, and 
insisted on a real option because that would result in capital gains 
treatment of the proceeds. The effect of the decision that the tax 
advantages were the consideration for the option is to eliminate the 
tax advantages. The use of parol to alter the bargained-for effect of 
documents is forbidden. Paloni v. Beebe, supra; Wood v. Roberts, 
supra; Rice, Melby Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 646 P.2d 696 
(Utah 1982) . 
In practical effect, the Court of Appeals has held that parol 
testimony regarding the intentions of one side of a transaction is 
sufficient to sustain specific enforcement of an agreement without 
payment of the stated consideration due from that side. The evidence 
here is that an attorney, not a party, without being privy to any 
negotiations and without communication with the parties on the subject 
of consideration, concluded that the $5,000.00 recited need not be 
paid, and that his client testified contrarily about whether he 
thought the $5,000.00 had to be paid. The Utah Supreme Court has 
never permitted parol reconstruction of two party agreements based 
upon evidence of the intent of one party, and has held specifically 
that parol evidence that deeds absolute on their face were intended as 
mortgages must prove the intent of both parties, and must be clear and 
convincing. Corey v. Roberts, supra; Thomas v. Ogden State Bank, 
supra; Kjar v. Brimley, supra. 
Question 3 
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the decision of the Dis-
trict Court was based upon a finding that the testimony of Frank Allen 
"was more credible and consistent than Colman's". Opinion, p. 5. It 
also acknowledged that certain "notes" in Colman's writing, admitted 
for purposes of showing that Colman's testimony was not as credible 
and consistent as Allen's, "were not totally legible, partially cut 
off by the copier, and stapled together by Miller's attorneys". 
Opinion, p. 6. The documents (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 54, 55, 56) are 
also discontinuous, unnumbered as to sequence, and without internal 
indications of their original form or order: all matters the Court of 
Appeals could have observed by looking at the documents. In fact, the 
documents defy comprehension, and no explanation was provided for 
their condition except Miller's counsel's handling of them outside the 
regular processes of discovery. Copies of the documents as admitted 
in the District Court are appended hereto as Appendix B. 
The Court of Appeals refused to exercise any judgment of its own 
about the probative value of the documents, and refused to apply to 
the "notes" the standard of Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 106 that 
documents so incomplete that their meaning cannot be fairly determined 
should not be admitted. See McCormick, McCormick on Evidence, §56, 
3rd Ed. (1984). This appears to be the first reported decision of a 
Utah appellate court interpreting Ev. Rule 106. 
The Court of Appeals repeated the District Court's incorrect 
conclusion that the "notes" were "duplicative of other competent 
evidence that impeached Colman's trial testimony". In fact, counsel's 
claim for the notes was that they transcribed admissions of Archer and 
Wolfe supportive of Miller's claims; that is, the documents were also 
used to impeach Archer and Wolfe by inuendo. See Tr. Vol. VI, p. 
1114. 
The decision of the Court of Appeals approving admission of the 
"notes" requires review because it establishes an improper interpreta-
tion of Evidence Rule 106, and because the improper admission of the 
documents directly affected what the District Court and Court of 
Appeals regarded as a central issue in the determination, the credi-
bility of Colman. 
The Court of Appeals1 observation, based upon a case which pre-
dates adoption of Evidence Rule 106 in Utah (Opinion, p. 6), that 
writings of a witness may be introduced for purposes of impeachment, 
simply begs the question whether any document may be admitted, for any 
purpose, if it is in such incomplete form that its meaning cannot be 
fairly determined. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has an obligation, where the 
documents are placed before it, to observe for itself whether the 
import of the documents can be fairly determined. Here the Court of 
Appeals ends analysis with the remark that "The trial court found 
that, although the notes were not totally legible, partially cut off 
by the copier, and stapled together by Millerfs attorneys, they did 
provide a certain narrative flow and consistency that gave them sub-
stantial credibility." 
Question 4 
On the basis of cases from Florida and California which hold that 
where a purchaser of property deposits funds for the purchase, but 
subsequently withdraws them because the seller wrongfully refuses to 
complete the transaction, the purchaser is entitled to interest accru-
ing on his money while in deposit, the Court of Appeals holds that 
plaintiff was entitled to interest on the money deposited to obtain 
specific performance in this case (Opinion, pp. 6-7), though it was 
admitted that plaintiff had and exercised during the pendency of the 
proceedings all of the use and possession of the property for which he 
claimed he purchased it. Tr. Vol. II, pp. 223-224, 275-280, 287-291, 
295, 297). The corresponding testimony about defendants was that 
during the same period they did not occupy the property, could not 
dispose of it because of plaintiff's lis pendens, and made no use of 
its except for one season in one year, with plaintiff's consent, 
leasing the fraction of it suitable for the purpose to a cattle ranch-
er. Tr. Vol. IV, p. 54; Vol. V, pp. 781-782. 
This decision requires review because it is directly contrary to 
the Supreme Court's decision in Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 
1980). The law of Utah is that where specific performance is decreed 
the parties are to be given the benefits of their bargain as of the 
date it was to be executed. The buyer should have the benefit of 
possession of the land, and the seller should have the benefit of 
possession of the money, from the date of execution. The Court is 
required in such case to apportion between buyer and seller the value 
of the money deposited, and the value of the use of the land, from and 
after the date money and the land should have been exchanged, based 
upon who actually had use of the money and/or land. Eliason v. Watts, 
615 P.2d 427, 430-431 (Utah 1980). If, because of a deposit, buyer 
has not had use of his money, and the seller has meanwhile denied 
buyer use of the land, the buyer is entitled to the interest accumu-
lated on the money (and perhaps also to additional rental value of the 
land). On the other hand, if the seller has not had use of the money, 
and has provided buyer use of the land, the seller is entitled to the 
interest on the deposited funds* If buyer and seller have shared use 
of the land, some appropriate apportionment of the interest is re-
quired. Anything else denies the parties the benefit of their 
bargain. 
The Court of Appeals should have awarded interest on the depos-
ited funds to defendants, with a reduction for the rent received for 
cattle running. 
Dated this 13th day of April, 1988. s-—; 
( / > - > 
E. Craig Smay \ 
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Dear Mr. Smay: 
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing 
heretofore filed herein, and the arguments of counsel 
thereupon had, it is ordered that the rehearing be, and 
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Sincerely, 
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Utah Coun of A^**a!s 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellants John D. Archer and Elizabeth B. Archer, both 
individually and as Trustees for the Elizabeth Daly Archer 
Trust, and Hubert Wolfe, Judy W. Wolfe, and Elliott Wolfe, as 
Trustees for Elliott Wolfe Trust No.'701 (MArcherM and/or 
"Wolfe"), appeal from the trial court's judgment ordering 
specific performance of an option to buy land in favor of 
Respondent Ernest J. Miller ("Miller-), and from the award of 
accrued interest to Miller. We affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Miller's action for specific performance against Archer 
and Wolfe arises out of an earlier business relationship 
between Archer, Wolfe, and William J. Colman, the third-party 
defendant ("Colman"). Because it is integral to our decision, 
we set out in detail the factual background of this complex 
transaction. On appeal, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the trial court's findings. See Security State 
Bank v. Broadhead, 734 P.2d 469, 470-71 (Utah 198J). 
In the late summer or early fall of 1981, Colman 
approached Archer and Wolfe for a loan of $750,000. Colman 
urgently needed the money to continue development of a business 
venture. Archer advised Colman that he and Wolfe were not 
interested in a simple loan due to the adverse tax consequences 
resulting from interest income, nor would they invest the 
$750,000 amount requested. Colraan then offered Archer and 
Wolfe a limited partnership interest in a salt project known as 
"Carson Sink" in Nevada ("limited partnership"), and an 
interest in "Anderson Ranch" which Colman owned. 
After consulting with their accountants about the tax 
consequences, Archer and Wolfe told Colman they would advance a 
total of $500,000, on the condition that the deal was 
structured as follows: (1) a $250,000 investment in the 
limited partnership, providing research and development tax 
write-offs, an interest in profits during the life of the 
partnership, and an overriding royalty thereafter, and (2) cash 
payment of $250,000 as the purchase price of the Anderson 
Ranch, coupled with a one-year option under which Colman could 
repurchase the ranch for $600,000, allowing Archer and Wolfe to 
treat the dollar return as capital gain. 
Frank J. Allen ("Allen"), Colman1s attorney, drafted the 
documents according to this plan. Allen structured the deal as 
three separate transactions in order to achieve the tax 
advantages Archer and Wolfe sought: (1) a limited partnership 
interest; (2) the purchase of Anderson Ranch; and (3) a 
one-year option to repurchase Anderson Ranch. 
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Before the documents were executed, Archer and Wolfe 
agreed to give Colman a one and one-half (1-1/2) year option, 
instead of the original one-year option, for an increased total 
purchase price of $650,000, and the documents reflect this 
change. 
The Option states that it was given to Colman "in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5000.00) 
and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged.H Allen testified that the recital of 
"$5000.00 and other good and valuable consideration the receipt 
of which is hereby acknowledged1* was inserted by him merely as 
a legal shorthand for the true consideration. He claimed the 
$5000 was never intended to be the actual consideration for the 
Option and that is why the recital indicated that $5000 had 
been paid. Allen claimed that the real consideration for the 
Option was the execution of the limited partnership agreement, 
the Anderson Ranch agreement, and the various tax benefits 
accruing to Archer and Wolfe by the structuring of the deal. 
Colman did not pay $5000 to Archer and Wolfe for the 
Option. Archer and Wolfe made various verbal inquiries 
regarding payment, to which Colman responded he did not believe 
he had to pay the $5000 based on the advice of Allen. 
On November 2, 1982, Colman executed a Real Estate 
Contract which assigned his rights under the Option to Miller 
as Colman could not secure the $650,000 necessary to exercise 
the Option. Subsequently, Archer and Wolfe received written 
notice of this assignment and contacted Miller to inform him 
that the $5000 for the Option had never been paid by Colman. 
In addition, despite the lack of payment, Archer stated that he 
and Wolfe were still willing to sell the Anderson Ranch to 
Miller for a purchase price of $655,000. Negotiations for this 
sale occurred, but it was never consummated. 
On April 8, 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to revoke 
the Option. Subsequently, Miller, Colman and Allen met and 
discussed the status of the Option and all agreed that the 
$5000 was never intended to be paid, but merely functioned as 
window-dressing. The true consideration consisted of the 
structuring of the transaction. Allen and Colman executed 
affidavits to this effect following this meeting. 
On May 16, 1983, Miller filed this action against Archer 
and Wolfe and a lis pendens against the Anderson Ranch. Archer 
and Wolfe later filed a third-party complaint against Colman. 
On July 1, 1S83, Miller tendered to Archer and Wolfe his 
cashier's check for $650,000 as an exercise of the Option 
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to purchase the Anderson Ranch. The check was deposited in an 
interest-bearing account, with entitlement to such interest to 
be determined by the court. Since Miller's July 1, 1983 
tender, Archer and Wolfe have held possession and all rights of 
ownership to the Anderson Ranch. 
CONSIDERATION FOR OPTION 
The primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly ruled that the attempted revocation of the Option was 
ineffective. The trial court found there was adequate 
consideration to support the Option and therefore Miller was 
entitled to specific performance. Over Archer's and Wolfe's 
objections, the trial court admitted parol evidence to 
ascertain the intended consideration for the Option. On 
appeal, Archer and Wolfe contend the consideration can be 
gleaned from the plain language of the Option and. therefore, 
the trial court erred in admitting such evidence.* We 
disagree. 
Even if a written agreement appears to be completely 
integrated, parol evidence is admissible to establish whether 
there was consideration for a promise. Soukop v. Snvder, 709 
P.2d 109, 113 (Hawaii Ct. App. 1985) (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 218(2)(1981)). A recital of 
consideration received is usually intended merely as written 
acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment. It is inserted 
for convenience, usually because the parties do not want to 
reveal the real consideration. Paloni v. Beebe, 100 Utah 115, 
118, 110 P.2d 563, 565 (1941) (quoting 9 Wigmore, Evidence 
§ 2433 (3rd ed. 1981). Therefore, the parol evidence rule does 
not prevent a party from showing the actual consideration when 
a nominal consideration is recited. Wood v. Roberts, 586 P.2d 
405, 407 (Utah 1978). 
There is substantial evidence to support the trial 
court's conclusion that the recital of "$5000.00 and other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged" in the Option was nominal consideration inserted 
1. The contentions of Archer and Wolfe are inconsistent. They 
argue the consideration can be gleaned from the plain language 
of the Option. However, while making this argument, they seem 
to ignore the plain language of the Option which states that 
the receipt of the consideration is hereby acknowledged. We 
will not vievs the language of the Option out of context as 
urged by Archer and Wolfe. 
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by the drafter of the agreement for convenience as the parties 
did not wish to reveal in writing the true consideration for 
the deal. 
At trial, there was conflicting testimony on the 
necessity of paying the $5000 to Archer and Wolfe* Colman 
claimed he knew that the $5000 was required to be paid before 
he could exercise the Option. However, Colman's testimony was 
contradicted by his own admissions on cross-examination, his 
deposition prior to trial, his affidavit of May 2, 1983, and 
his contemporaneous handwritten notes. Allen testified that he 
had consistently informed the parties that he had inserted the 
$5000 amount on his own, intending it as a legal shorthand for 
the true consideration, and it was not an item for which the 
parties bargained. 
The trial court found Allen's testimony more credible and 
consistent than Colman's, finding that the $5000 was never 
intended to be paid. "[D]ue regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
witnesses." Adams v. Gubler, 731 P.2d 494, 496 n.3 (Utah 1986) 
(quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)). There is substantial evidence 
to support the determination of the trial court, and, thus, 
that finding must be sustained. Sather v. Pitcher, 73 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 85, 86 (Ct. App. 1987). 
The trial court found the true consideration for the 
Option was embodied in the phrase "other good and valuable 
consideration." Because of its ambiguity, the trial court 
considered parol evidence to disclose its true meaning. 
M[W]hen a contract is ambiguous, because of the uncertain 
meaning of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies, 
parol evidence is admissible to explain the parties' intent." 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth. 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); 
Colonial Leasing Co, v. Larsen Bros. Const,. 731 P.2d 483, 487 
(Utah 1986) . In such a determination, we defer to the finder 
of fact. Craig Food Indus., Inc. v. Weihina, 746 P.2d 279, 283 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d at 1293; 
Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co,. 590 P.2d 348, 350 (Utah 1979). 
The trial court considered the testimony of the parties 
and found that this phrase referred to the execution of the 
various documents conveying the Anderson Ranch and limited 
partnership interests, and the general tax structuring of the 
total transaction. The trial court looked at the substance of 
the parties' entire dealings and found that the structuring of 
the total commitments was the intended consideration for the 
Option. We cannot say this was error. Sather v. Pitcher, 73 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 86. 
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Archer and Wolfe also contend that the one and one-half 
(1-1/2) year option was a new agreement executed after the 
original one-year option, and therefore required new 
consideration. We disagree. The facts support the trial 
court's finding that the original one-year option was never 
finalized. The original consideration supported the one and 
one-half (1-1/2) year option. 
The trial court's finding that there was sufficient 
consideration to support the Option does not invalidate any of 
the other agreements, as Archer and Wolfe claim. The Option, 
limited partnership agreement, purchase contract and special 
warranty deed are in no way impaired and are still valid and 
enforceable agreements within the context of the larger 
transaction, as the parties intended. The trial court merely 
found the execution of these other agreements was the intended 
consideration for the Option. 
COLMAN'S HANDWRITTEN NOTES 
Archer and Wolfe claim the trial court committed 
reversible error in admitting copies of Colman's handwritten 
notes, made during the course of the negotiations between him 
and Archer and Wolfe. The notes conflicted with Colman's trial 
testimony. The trial court found that, although the notes were 
not totally legible, partially cut off by the copier, and 
stapled together by Miller's attorneys, they did provide a 
certain narrative flow and consistency that gave them 
substantial credibility. These notes were properly admitted 
for impeachment purposes. Schocker v. Milton 0. Bitner Co,, 30 
Utah 2d 173, 176, 514 P.2d 1290, 1292 (1973); Utah R. Evid. 
801(d)(1)(A). Furthermore, the admission of the notes was 
duplicative of other competent evidence that impeached Colman's 
trial testimony, including Colman's prior deposition and 
affidavit. 
INTEREST 
Archer and Wolfe also challenge the award of accrued 
interest to Miller. The trial court concluded that Miller was 
entitled to the accruing interest on the $650,000 deposited 
with the clerk of the court after Archer and Wolfe refused the 
tender by Miller and retained possession of Anderson Ranch, 
Common law and equity require that if a party obligated 
to sell land retains possession, forcing the buyer to place 
funds on deposit with the court pending settlement of the 
action, then the seller is not entitled to the accrued interest 
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on the deposited funds. Rasmussen v. Moe, 292 P.2d 226/ 230 
(Cal. 1956); Resnick v. Goldman, 133 So.2d 770, 771-772 (Fla. 
1961). The trial court's finding that Archer and Wolfe had 
enjoyed possession and all rights of ownership of the Anderson 
Ranch since Miller's July 1, 1983 tender of the $650,000 
necessary to exercise the Option was supported by substantial 
evidence. Archer and Wolfe retained all rents and profits paid 
for grazing use of the land by third parties. In contrast, 
Miller received no commercial benefit from the Anderson Ranch. 
What limited and sporadic recreational use Miller has had of 
the ranch has been without objection by Archer and Wolfe, and 
similar to that traditionally enjoyed by many others in the 
area. 
Affirmed. Costs to Miller, 
&S 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
RicJlarcT'cTT JDavidson, Judge 
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THIS MATTER having come on for trial before the 
above-entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call, District Judge, 
presiding and sitting without a jury, qn September 18, 19, 20, 27, 
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985; and Plaintiff 
having been represented by its counsel of record, L, Brent Hoggan, 
of Olson & Hoggan, the Defendants having been represented by their 
counsel of record, E. Craig Smay, and the Third-Party Defendant 
having been represented by himself; and the Court having heard 
testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto during the 
trial hereof and having received certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter; and the Court having received 
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff a*ri8 the Defendants on 
the primary issues before the Court, and having reviewed the 
Findings, Conclusions and Judgment prepared by Plaintiff and the 
Defendants1 Objections thereto, and the Court having heretofore 
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure No. 15, and on 
Plaintiff's motion at trial, the Plaintiff's Complaint is deemed 
amended to conform to the evidence and Plaintiff's arguments at 
trial, specifically including but not limited to quieting title to 
the Anderson Ranch with regard to Colman's (and Archer and 
Wolfe's) attempted exercise of the 4,b. option one (1)-year after 
this litigation commenced, Plaintiff's claim to the accruing 
interest on the tender money, and Plaintiff's request that the 
Option, Real Estate Contract, Waiver and Release and the Complaint 
herein be reformed to reflect the correct legal description of the 
Anderson Ranch. 
2. The Court declares that the recorded Option, Real Estate 
Contract and Waiver and Release are valid agreements, binding on 
all parties thereto, and fully enforceable by Plaintiff as the 
N & HOGGAN 
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proper assignee of Colman's Option on the Anderson Ranch and 
all appurtenant water rights. 
3. Plaintiff is the owner and holder of the Option, the 
Option is declared irrevocable, and by virtue of Plaintiff!s 
proper exercise of the Option and Plaintiff's tender on July 1, 
1983 of the purchase price provided in the Option, the Option is 
specifically enforced and title to the Anderson Ranch situated in 















of the S 
Range 4 
The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
h half of the Northeast quarter; the Southeast 
of the Northwest quarter; the East half of the 
t quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southwest 
.of Section 26; the North half of .the Northwest 
the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
25; the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter; 
heast quarter of the Southeast quarter; the Southwest 
of the Southeast quarter; the South half of the 
t quarter of Section 24; the Southeast quarter of the 
t quarter of Section 23; in Township 10 North, Range 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian; Lots 2, 3 and 4; the 
t quarter of the Southwest quarter; the Southwest 
of the Southeast quarter; and the Northeast quarter 
outheast quarter of Section 19, Township 10 North, 
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26, Township 10 
North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 3: The Northeast quarter; the Southeast quarter of 
the Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter; the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of j 
Section 19, the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the j 
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in ! 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and ! 
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Section 26, 
Township 10 North, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter; and the Southeast 
1) 752-1551 
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quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range 4 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Containing 1840.14 acres, more or less, subject to existing 
rights of way. 
Together with all water rights appurtenant to the above-
described property. 
is hereby vested and quieted in Plaintiff free and clear of 
all right and claim by Defendants, Royalty Investment Corporation 
or Colman and any claiming by, under or through Defendants, 
Royalty Investment Corporation or Colman. 
4. The $650,000.00 deposited by Plaintiff with the Clerk of 
the Court is declared to be payment in full by Plaintiff to 
Defendants for the Anderson Ranch. The Clerk of the Court is 
authorized and directed to deliver to Defendants on their request 
the 5650,000.00 principal. 
5. All interest accrued on the $650,000.00 deposited by 
Plaintiff with the Clerk of the Court is declared to be the 
propertv of Plaintiff and the Clerk of the Court is authorized and 
directed to deliver all such accrued interest to Plaintiff on his 
reques t. 
6. The legal description in the Option (recorded in Book 310 
at Page 144 of the records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in 
the Real Estate Contract (recorded in Book 310 at Page 147 of the 
records of the Cache County, Utah Recorder) in the Waiver and 
Release (recorded in Book 315 and Page 658 of the records of the 
Cache County, Utah Recorder), as well as in the Verified Complaint 
filed by the Plaintiff herein, are each and all reformed to show 
Parcel 3 situated in Township 10 North, rather than Township 10 
South. 
7. That possession of the Anderson Ranch, described above, 
is hereby delivered to Plaintiff free and clear of any claim, 
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possessory or otherwise, of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants 
and Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation. 
8. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option under 
the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Archer and Wolfe) on July 
2, 1984 is declared by the Court to be an invalid exercise of that 
option right. The agreement and any assignments or conveyances of 
whatsoever nature between Colman and the Defendants related 
thereto are hereby declared void and of no effect as to the 
parties herein; and full, undivided title in fee simple to the 
Anderson Ranch is hereby quieted in Plaintiff *a§ against any and 
all claims or rights of Defendants, Third-Party Defendants and 
Royalty Investment Corporation, or any claiming by, under or 
through Defendants and/or Third-Party Defendants and/or Royalty 
Investment Corporation. 
9. The Plaintiff's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and 
Motion To Strike are rendered moot bv this Judgment and Decree, 
which effectively grants the partial relief sought by those 
motions but which is based on the entire trial record. 
10. The Defendants1 Cross-Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment is denied. Defendantsf Counterclaim against the 
Plaintiff and Defendants' Third-Party Complaint against Colman are 
dismissed with prejudice. 
11. That Exhibits 28, 54, 55 and 56 are admitted in /
 m, ~r ,; 
evidenced A^/;<-^*^« c.i^i^^^A L^rfLr ^<-^t ^ f ^ U ^ 
12.' The parties shall bear their own respective attorney's 
fees, but Plaintiff is awarded his court costs incurred herein. 
DATED this / - day of-<&%, 1986. -. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Judgment and Decree to Defendants1 Attorney, E. Craig Smay, at 208 
Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101; and 
to Third-Party Defendant, William J, Colman, at 1935 South Main, 
Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage prepaid in Logan, 
Utah, this tf*9- day of July, 1 986. 
,iP^S^^c( 




I hereby certify that I mailed a certified copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment and Decree to 
L. Brent Hoggan, Olson & Hoggan, Attorneys for Plaintiff, 56 West Center, 
P. 0. Box 525, Logan, Utah 84321; E. Craig Smay at 208 Kearns Building, 
136 South Main, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 and to Third-Party Defendant, 
William J. Colman, at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84105, postage prepaid in Brigham City, Utah, this 7th'day of August, 
1986. 
*".) 
L. Brent Hoggan 
OLSON & HOGGAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
56 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone 752-1551 
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ERNEST J. MILLER, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE. JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Defendants, 
JOHN D. ARCHER and ELIZABETH 
B. ARCHER, both individually and 
as Trustees for the Elizabeth 
Daly Archer Trust, and HUBERT 
WOLFE, JUDY W. WOLFE, and ELLIOTT 
WOLFE, as Trustees for Elliott 
Wolfe Trust No. 701, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
WILLIAM J. COLMAN, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 21692 
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THIS LMATTER having come on for trial before the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Omer J. Call District Judge, 
presiding and sitting without a jury, on September 18. 19, 20 27. 
October 3, November 14, and December 17, 1985* and Plaintiff 
having been represented by its counsel of record, L. Brent Hoggan, 
of Olson & Hoggan, and the Defendants having been represented by 
their counsel of record, E. Craig Smay. and the Third-Party 
Defendant, knowingly, voluntarily and after discussing the same 
with the Court, having been represented by himself- and the Court 
having heard testimony from witnesses for all the parties hereto 
and having received and accepted certain exhibits offered by the 
parties as evidence in the matter' and the Courts having received 
trial briefs from counsel for both Plaintiff and the Defendants on 
the primary issues before the Court- and the Court having made and 
entered its written Memorandum Decision herein, and having 
reviewed and considered Plaintiff's proposed Findings, Conclusions 
and Judgment and Defendants1 Objections thereo and being fully 
advised in the premises, THE COURT DOES NOW MAKE AND ENTER THE 
FOLLOWING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The real property which is the subject of this action by 
Plaintiff for specific performance of a purchase option relating 
'to said property is a composite of several semi-contiguous parcels 
of undeveloped land and appurtenant water rights located Southeast 
of Paradise. Utah, comprising in the whole 1840.14 acres, more or 
less, primarily used for cattle grazing and recreation, and 
generally known and referred to hereinafter as the tfAnderson 
Ranch51, which property is located totally within the boundaries of 
Cache County. Utah, and more particularly described as follows 
Parcel 1: The Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter-
the South half of the Northeast quarter - the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter- the East half of the 
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quarter of Section 24' the 
utheast quarter of Section 23* in 
East. Salt Lake Base and Meridian 
ast quarter of the Southwest 
ter of the Southeast quarter - and 
e Southeast quarter of Section 19 
East. Salt Lake Base and 
Parcel 2: The West half of the Southeast quarter and the 
East half of the Southwest quarter of Section 26. Township 10 
North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Parcel 3 The Northeast quarter the Southeast quarter of 
tFe"Northwest quarter; the Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter* the Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of 
Section 19. the East half of the Northeast quarter; and the 
North half of the Southeast quarter of Section 30, in 
Township 10 North, Range 4 East of the Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. Also the Southwest quarter of Section 25, and the 
Southwest quarter of the Northwest quarter of Seer ion 26, 
Township 10 North. Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and 
Meridian. 
Parcel 4: The West half of the Northeast quarter; the 
Northeast quarter of the Northwest quarter- and the Southeast 
quarter of the Southwest quarter; of Section 30, Township 10 
North, Range 4 East, SaLt Lake Base and Meridian. 
Together with all water rights 
described property. 
<5r fe /#' '<v* 
to the above-
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2. The Plaintiff herein, Ernest Junior Miller (hereinafter 
"MilLer"), is a resident of Cache County. Utah. The Defendants 
named herein, both as individuals and as trustees, John D. Archer 
(hereinafter "Archer"), Elizabeth B. Archer, Elliott Wolfe 
(hereinafter "Wolfe"), Hubert Wolfe and Judy W. Wolfe, are all 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah. The Third-Party Defendant 
herein, William J. Colman (hereinafter "Colman")-, is also a 
-4 
^ 
resident of Salt Lake County, Utah. MilLer. Coiman, Archer 
and Wolfe are men of considerable business experience and acumen, 
particuarly in matters of cattle raising and beef fabrication 
(Miller), mining, oil and gas (Coiman and Archer) and real estate 
(Archer, Wolfe and Coiman). J\eehtrc—arnrt~"Wol fe aic mun of—-
eet«4nde^ab-le—f-wn^nr vM~-^su&&V3ttce 
3. Coiman is a shareholder and President of Royalty 
Investment Corporation, also known as Royalty Investment Company 
(hereinafter "Royalty"), a Utah corporation. Most, if not all. of 
the balancer-of JRoyalty's stock, is owned by Colman's relatives > and 
the company is. within Coiman1s effective control. Coiman acquired^ 
the Anderson Ranch for Royalty irpi = :^ by purchasing E. H. Cameron 
and H. C. Anderson's rights (as Buyers) under a June 1961 Contract 
of Sale with LaMar Anderson and Lucille Anderson (as Sellers). 
4. In the late Summer or early Fall of 1981, Coiman ap-
proached Defendant Archer for a loan of $750,000.00, money whicn 
CoLman urgentLy needed to continue development of the Carson Sink 
salt project (certain mineral rights and evaporation ponds used 
for commercial salt production located in Nevada). Said mineral 
project was owned by Owanah Oil Corporation, of which Coiman was 
President, and was in serious financial trouble due, at least in 
part, to excessive precipitation in the past. 
5. Subsequently, Archer advised Coiman that Archer and 
Wolfe, with whom Archer had discussed Colman's offer, were not 
interested in a simple Loan and were not interested in investing 
^!T^rj^^ha?F==^©:@=^afeQ# in any event. Coiman suggested that fr-he: !c 
could be secured by the Anderson ;/ 
'ft 
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Ranch (indicating that Coiman. at least, beLieved the ranch had 
that much value). The possibility of a limited partnership 
interest in the Carson Sink salt project was also discussed. 
6. Based upon these preliminary discussions. Coiman had his 
long-time attorney, Frank J. Allen, of Salt Lake City. Utah 
(hereinafter "Allen"), prepare a document (Exhibit 1) by which 
Archer and Wolfe would invest $600,000.00 in a limited partnership 
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with a Trust Deed on the Anderson Ranch. Said document was 
never executed. 
7. Subsequently and after considering certain tax savings 
possibilities with their accountants. Archer and WoLfe advised 
CoLman that they were only interested in advancing Colman 
$500,000.00 total for his salt project, and this on condition that 
the $500,000.00 be structured to appear by record as an investment 
of $250,000.00 in a Limited partnership on the salt project, 
providing tax write-offs for research and development expenses, 
and an interest in profits during the life of the partnership and 
an overriding royaLty thereafter; and with the other $250,000.00 
to be shown as the purchase price for the Anderson Ranch, coupled 
with a one-year option in Colman to reacquire the Ranch for 
$600,000.00, which would permit Defendants to treat the difference 
as a capital gain. Archer, Wolfe and Colman reached an agreement 
in principle on this arrangement, and Defendants accepted Colman's 
suggestion that Allen draw up the necessary papers to document the 
deal. 
8. In October and/or November of 1981, Archer, Wolfe and 
Colman met with Allen at the latterfs office on at least two 
separate occasions, first to discuss their agreement and later to 
execute the documents prepared by Mr. Allen pursuant to their 
instructions. AlLen was advised by Archer, Wolfe and Colman that. 
although the primary purpose of the arrangement was to get 
$500,000.00 to Colman for his salt project, they wanted the deal 
structured such that it would appear as three separate 
transactions (i.e., the limited partnership, the purchase of the 
ranch, and the option back on the ranch), $Q a&—&* 1P,WP PT—p^rpg^ 
rr2^^^ar^^fe=$K§: and secure Archer and Wolfe all the tax 
advantages they were seeking. The structure of the deal was not 
so critical to Colman as securing the $500,000.00 from the 
Defendants, as long as he had an opportunity to get the Anderson 
Ranch back. The different dates on the various documents were 
largely irrelevant to him. He was in great need of the money and 
-6-
was willing to use the various resources within his control to 
consummate a deal any way he could. 
9. Pursuant to the directions received from Archer, Wolfe 
and 'Colman, Allen prepared the Certificate and Agreement of 
Limited Partnership of Solar Chemical Company, for Archer and 
Wolfe's $250,000.00 contribution to the salt project (Exhibit 3, 
hereinafter the "Limited Partnership Agreement11) , the Contract for 
Purchase of Real Property, for the purchase by Defendants of the 
Anderson Ranch for $250,000.00 (Exhibit 4, hereinafter the 
"Contract"), the Special Warranty Deed from Royalty to the 
Defendants (Exhibit 5), and an option from Defendants to Colman to 
permit him to repurchase the Anderson Ranch for $600,000.00. 
Subsequently, the parties agreed to give Colman an option on the 
Anderson Ranch for 1-1/2 years for a purchase price of $650,000.00 
(Exhibit 8, hereinafter the "Option"). The original one (l)-year 
option for $600,000.00 was never executed by the parties. 
10. The Limited Partnership Agreement establishing Solar 
Chemical Company was dated October 15, 1981, as was Archer's 
initial check to Owanah Oil Corporation, the General Partner in 
Solar Chemical Company, for $50,000.00 (Exhibit 23). Colman was a 
shareholder and President of Owanah, which company apparently was 
within his effective control. 
11. The Limited Partnership Agreement provided for periodic 
contributions by the Limited Partners. Archer and Wolfe, totaLling 
$250,000.00, and states that Archer and Wolfe were each to receive 
a five percent (5%) share in Solar Chemical's net profits over 
three (3) years and that each would receive a one-half of one 
percent ( #&$57o) overriding royalty thereafter on all sodium salts 
recovered from the project. 
12. The Contract between Royalty (signed by Colman, as 
President), as Seller, and Archer, Archer's wife and Wolfe, as the 
N & HOGGAN 
RNEYSATLAW s o l e named T r u s t e e of E l l i o t t Wolfe T r u s t 701 ( h e r e i n a f t e r t h e 
/VEST CENTER 
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m752.i53i sale of the Anderson Ranch to the Defendants, specifying January 
4, 1982 as the closing date. It was dated November 9, 1981, 
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13. The Special Warranty Deed conveying the Anderson Ranch 
from Royalty (again signed by CoLman, as President) to the 
Defendants was dated January 4, 1982 (Exhibit 5). Said Special 
Warranty Deed, as well as the Contract and the Option, all contain 
a scrivinorfs error in the legal description of the Anderson 
Ranch, mistakenly and unintentionally referencing Township 10 
South, instead of Township 10 North, in Parcel 3 thereof. No 
evidence was received (or offered) suggesting that Colman acted 
without authority in executing the Contract, the Special Warranty-^ 
Deed oi & 
J 
.-o 
>r subsequent deeds as President .of Royalty Investment 
Corporation. The documents/}^vf-H^rr fcaate^valid;; op -•1ihrfTs=aTrrr-e-. 
14. The Option from the Defendants to Colman was dated March 
of 1982 (viz, "this day of March, 1982"). The purpose of 
said Option was to allow Colman the right to reacquire the Ander-
son Ranch on or before July 2, 1983 for $650,000.00. It was 
executed by Archer, Mrs. Archer and Wolfe in their individual and 
respective trustee capacities. T&e-iT—ex^^^^i^^—trf—Die OplTorF- gs'^'l* 
cciiii^ e^ rpnTrds—-pireeibely with how they rook citrle to (The Anderson <y [ ^ 
15. All of the aforereferenced documents. Exhibits 3, 4, 5 
and 8, were prepared at or about the same time by Frank Allen, 
pursuant to the instructions of the parties, as part of a unified, 
integrated transaction. They were all executed by the parties on 
the same date, most likely on or about November 9, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
16. Although Colman was in debt and had an acute need for 
funds to continue his salt project, Archers' check to Owanah Oil 
in the amount of $50,000.00, dated October 15, 1981 (Exhibit 23), 
was not cashed by Colman until on or about November 10, 1981, as 
indicated on the back of said check. 
(s ; ^ 
V\ 17. j Colman and his attorney, Allen, required a simultaneous 
execution of the documents, particularly the Contract, the 
original Special Warranty Deed and the Option, in order to assure 
that Colman was protected as to his right to reacquire the 
Anderson Ranch, even though the dates were spaced out for 
Defendants1 tax purposes. The Court finds it probable that 
Archer, likewise, was unwilling to part with his first check for 
$50,000.00 prior to securing the Defendants' position with a 
-8-
Limited Partnership Agreement, Contract and Option be executed 
at the same time so that Colman would not be deeding away the 
Anderson Ranch without a right to repurchase the same. Such an 
entitlement was always part of the parties1 agreement and 
essential to Colman1s willingness to enter into the related 
transactions. Colman was promised that right to repurchase the 
Ranch as part of the total deal and relied on that promise in 
executing the deed conveying the Ranch to Defendants. 
18. Elliott Wolfe represented to Colman and Allen that he 
had authority to sign any agreement for his trust and intended 
that his signature bind the trust and that Colman and Allen rely 
thereon-, and Colman and Allen did rely upon his representation and 
signature. Mrs* Archer's signature was secured the same day that 
the other parties signed the Option, or the very next day. The 
Option was then deLivered by Archer, either that same day or the 
next day, to CoLman. 
19. AlLen never received a copy of the Wolfe Trust agreement 
from Wolfe (nor was it produced at trial): nor did the other 
ostensible trustees to the Wolfe Trust, Hubert Wolfe and Judy 
Wolfe, ever notify Colman, Allen or Miller that they objected to 
Wolfe's binding the Trust by his signature alone nor did Wolfe 
seriously claim that he lacked authority to bind the Wolfe Trust. 
20. The Option reads that it was given to Colman "in 
consideration of the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) and 
other good and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby 
acknowledged". This recital of $5,000.00 and the "other good and 
valuable consideration" came from Allen, who had also inserted the 
same figure in the original, one-year, $600,000.00 option to 
Colman. which was never executed. The fictitious $5,000.00 
consideration was carried over to the Option (Exhibit 8), which 
reflects the parties1 agreement to give Colman an option for 1-1/2 
N & HOGGAN 
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pa id . I t was merely window-dressing which Allen pul led out of the 
a i r and in se r t ed to g ive c redence to the document as pa r t of the 
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Defendants acknowledged receipt of the-same, even though they 
had not actually received $5,000.00, because they all knew it was 
not to be paid. The real consideration for the Option consisted 
of the ''other good and valuable consideration", which included the 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Special Warranty Deed from 
Royalty to the Defendants, the $650,000.00 to be paid for the 
Anderson Ranch upon exercise of the Option, the Limited 
Partnership benefits as to profit sharing and the overriding 
royalty, and the various tax benefits accruing to the Defendants 
by structuring the total transaction their way. The Court finds 
that it was never the intent of the parties at the time the Option 
was granted that $5,000.00 was the consideration for the Option, 
or that the $5,000.00 would, in fact, ever be paid. 
22. The Court notes that the Option on its face and by its 
terms gives the Defendants no right of revocation. There are no 
restrictions on its face as to its assignability by Colman to 
third parties, nor is there any language suggesting the Option was 
strictly personal to Colman. 
23. Within a week after November 15, 1981, the date of a 
title commitment from Northern Title Company (Exhibit 64), said 
report was mailed to Colman or Allen by said title company. This 
title report, among other things, disclosed an error in the legal 
description of the Anderson Ranch, as set forth in paragraph 13 of, 
these Findings. Two Special Warranty Deeds (Exhibits 6 and 7) 
were subsequently prepared for the purpose of conveying the 
Anderson Ranch from Royalty to the Defendants with the necessary 
correction to the legal description (i.e., changing "Township 10 
South" to "Township 10 North" for Parcel 3). They were dated 
January 4, 1982, and recorded by Allen on January 7, 1982. The 
new Special Warranty Deed for the Wolfe interest (Exhibit 7) in 
the Anderson Ranch was conveyed to "Elliott Wolfe, Trustee of the 
Elliott Wolfe Trust No. 701", and so recorded, without any 
A &HOGGAN 
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>.BOX525 24. On January 22, 1982, a Correction of Correction Deed 
)752.s5si (Exhibit 45) was executed by Lucille Anderson to Royalty, and 
thereafter recorded to correct the error contained in the 
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legal description of the 1980 deed from her and her husband to 
Royalty for the Anderson Ranch. 
25. Colman never paid $5,000.00 to the Defendants for the 
Option. Neither Archer nor Wolfe ever made any written request to 
Colman to pay the $5,000.00. When Archer made his first verbal 
inquiry regarding payment of the $5,000.00, which may have been 
sometime in March, 1982, Colman told him that he did not believe 
he had to pay the $5,000.00. When Colman contacted Allen, Allen 
reaffirmed for him that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be 
paid and advised Colman against paying it, inasmuch as the 
consideration supporting the total deal was comprised of those 
considerations set forth hereinabove at Finding'22. Allen 
consistently advised Colman, Archer, Wolfe and Plaintiff that the 
parties to the Option never intended for Colman to pay the 
$5,000.00. Colman never conceded that he owed the $5,000.00. 
26. The Defendants' Later assertions that Colman's 
non-payment of the $5,000.00 rendered the Option invalid and 
unenforceabLe lacks credibility , This Court finds that 
Defendants ' argument is Xme^r^e-by—^^ 
ttey—gjj-ed-^  n an a£-teafrpt.. -te==txi.yui-Lidate—t+re^ QptTTOri. It was never 
agreed or intended that Colman was to pay $5,000.00 to the 
Defendants. The number recited was fictitious, which is why the 
Defendants signed the Option acknowledging their receipt of that 
sum, as well as their receipt of the "other good and valuable 
consideration", which phrase circumscribed the true consideration 
for the Option, The Defendants' testimony as to their purported 
negotiations, renegotiations and the calculations which they 
allege resulted in the $5,000.00 consideration for the Option is 
contradicted not only by Allen's testimony and Colman's Affidavit, 
but by Defendant's own pleadings (viz., paragraph 4 of their 
Third-Party Complaint). 
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27. The Defendants represented to Colman and his attorney 
that CoLman would have a right to reacquire the Anderson Ranch. 
Defendants intended that Colman and his attorney should rely on 
those representations and upon the sufficiency of the Option, as 
executed. Colman and his attorney did rely on those 
representations and on the Option as executed. In light of 
Defendants1 subsequent repudiation of the Option, that reliance 
was to Colman's detriment. 
28. Archer and Wolfe never visited the Anderson Ranch or the 
Carson Sink salt project until the Spring of 1982. They never 
checked the title to the Carson Sink properties, nor did they ever 
verify the water rights appurtenant to the And ej: son Ranch, until 
the Spring of 1982. The Defendants never secured title insurance 
on the Anderson Ranch. 
29. The overriding royalty rights in the Carson Sink which 
the Limited Partnership Agreement states wiLl be assigned to 
Archer and Wolfe had not been assigned to them or recorded by them 
at the time of trial, four (4) years after trie Limited Partnership 
Agreement was executed. No profits have ever been paid out by 
SoLar Chemical to Archer or Wolfe. 
30. The price purportedly paid for the Anderson Rancn by 
Defendants to Royalty ($250,000.00), and the price which Colman 
was to pay Defendants to reacquire the Anderson Ranch under the 
Option only eighteen (18) months later ($650,000.00), cannot, as a 
matter of reason, stand alone. The property was professionally 
appraised (See Exhibit 59) for $427,240.00 ten (10) years prior to 
the sale by Colman to the Defendants. Moreover, even if the 
Anderson Ranch was worth only $250,000.00 on January 4, 1982, the 
Court cannot believe that Colman had a reasonable expectation that 
the market value of the Anderson Ranch would be 2607o of its prior 
sales value only 1-1/2 years later (or at any time in between). 
4 & HOGGAN J J 
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price he could for the ranch at the time, it was admitted that 
Colman, who had known for several years that Miller was interested 
in acquiring the Anderson Ranch or an interest therein, never 
contacted Miller to see if he would be interested in bidding more 
than 3250,000.00 for it. These prices make sense only when viewed 
in the context of the layer, unified transaction. 
31. Although it is not strictLy necessary to its decision, 
the Court finds that the $650,000.00 purchase price for Colman1s 
exercise of the Option more truly corresponds to a twenty percent 
(207o) return on a composite $500,000.00 secured investment by 
Defendants in Colman1s salt project for one and one-half (1-1/2) 
years. The total transaction was the functional equivalent of a 
secured loan ($500,000.00 loaned by Defendants to Colman for 1-1/2 
years at 207o interest, secured by the Anderson Ranch in case he 
failed to repay them), dressed up so as to give Archer and Wolfe 
certain additional incentives and to secure the Defendants various 
tax advantages (e.g., the tax write-off for their investment in 
Solar Chemical was worth a minimum to Archer and Wolfe of 
$60,000.00 -- See Exnibit li). 
32. The Court finds much credibility m the testimony of 
Allen. His recollections under oath are entitled to great weight. 
He was the only witness to the original negotiations and the 
preparation and execution of the central documents who was not a 
party to the same. He has no interest in the Anderson Ranch or 
the outcome of this litigation. Judging by his own testimony, and 
that of the Plaintiff, John Clay and John Miller, and Allen's own 
April 29, 1983 Affidavit (Exhibit 27), his statements have been 
consistent from the beginning with respect to the true nature of 
the parties' integrated transaction and the Option, in particular. 
If Allen's testimony were to be biased, one would reasonably 
expect that bias to favor his client but instead, Allen 
contradicted Colman's recollections at trial on several critical 
facts. 
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33- By contrast, the testimony of Bill Colman at trial, when 
measured against his admissions on cross-examination, and the 
contradictions contained in his prior deposition, his Affidavit of 
May 2, 1983 (Exhibit 28), and his handwritten notes (Exhibits 54, 
55 and 56), convince the Court that his testimony at trial is 
entitled to very little weight or credibility. Although Colmanfs 
Affidavit and handwritten notes are not strictly necessary to the 
Court's decision herein, they represent a more reliable index of 
the true history and intention of the parties than his trial 
testimony several years later and also serve to seriously impeach 
his trial testimony. His affidavit was signed under oath at a 
time when the relevant facts were much fresher in his memory than 
at trial, when his recollection of several matters was 
insufficient or non-existent. When Plaintiff's counsel presented 
him with Exhibits 54, 55 and 56, Colman expressed considerable 
surprise, alarm and anger, but admitted subsequently that they 
were copies of his own handwritten notes which he then read for 
the Court. Although tne notes are not totally legible, are 
partially cut off by the copier (particularly Exhibit 54), and 
were stapled together by Plaintiff's attorneys, they are for the 
most part dated, reference Defendants Archer and Wolfe and have a 
certain narrative flow and consistency that gives them substantial 
credibility. Any undue surprise to Defendants was overcome by the 
several days interval they had to inspect the Exhibits after their 
introduction and before Colman's testimony on the same. The 
demeanor of all the witnesses was significant to the Court during 
this trial. 
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34. In the late Spring or early Summer of 1982. Miller 
learned from Archer and Wolfe that they had obtained an interest 
in the Anderson Ranch. Subsequently, either in August or 
September of 1982, Miller discussed the status of the Anderson 
Ranch with Colman, who represented to Miller that Archer and 
Wolfe's interest in the Anderson Ranch was in the nature of a 
security interest. At the same time, Colman indicated a desire to 
sell his rights in the Anderson Ranch to Miller. 
35. Plaintiff's attorney, William L. Fillmore, of Logan, 
Utah, (hereinafter ffFi llmore1') , thereafter communicated with both 
Colman and Allen and received from them copies of the documents 
covering the prior integrated transaction between Colman and the 
Defendants, including receipt from Colman of the Option with 
original signatures of John Archer, Elizabeth Archer and Elliott 
Wolfe, and an original notarization by Carole Lake. The 
correspondence between Fillmore, Allen and Colman (Exhibits 68, 
69, 70 and 71) and testimony at trial indicate the preparation of 
a draft Real Estate Contract by Fillmore, Allen and Colman1s 
review of the same, negotiations (including one meeting at the 
Salt Lake Airport between Colman, Miller, Fillmore and John 
Miller, the Plaintiff's nephew), and the modification of the 
original draft. 
36. On November 2, 1982, Colman and Allen met Plaintiff, 
Fillmore and John Miller at the Salt Lake Airport to review and 
execute the revised Real Estate Contract (Exhibit 9, hereinafter 
the "Real Estate Contract") between Colman and Miller. After 
Colman and Allen reviewed the same, Colman and Miller then 
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executed the Real Estate Contract, dating the same November 2, 
1982. Pursuant to the contractual obligation contained therein 
Miller paid the $1,000.00 consideration to Colman in December, 
1982. 
37. The Real Estate Contract assigned all of Colman's rights 
under the Option to Miller, granting Miller an independent right 
to exercise the Option and acquire 1007o of the Anderson Ranch on 
or before June 18, 1982. 
38. Colman knowingly, voluntarily and with advice of counsel 
warranted in the Real Estate Contract to Miller that "the Option 
is valid and enforcable and, further, that it is freely assignable 
in its entirety without the consent or approval of any third 
party.11 
39. As part of the Real Estate Contract, Miller gave Colman 
a new and independent option to reacquire from Miller (if Miller 
exercised the Option), on or before July 2, 1983, all of trie 
Anderson Ranch by paying Plaintiff $650,000.00 on or before that 
date (See Exhibit 9, para. 4.a.), and a second option to 
reacquire, after July 2, 1983 and on or before July 2, 1984, up to 
a 507o interest in the Anderson Ranch by paying his prorated share 
of the purchase price, plus interest, taxes and improvements (See 
para. 4.b.). Plaintiff and Colman agreed that the Real Estate 
Contract was not assignable by either party without the other 
party's prior written consent (See paras. 4.e. and f.). 
40. Also as part of the Real Estate Contract, the parties 
granted each other a mutual and reciprocal right of first refusal 
with respect to either party's subsequent proposed sale of any of 
their rights or interests in the Anderson Ranch, and specified a 
thirty (30) day period in which to exercise the same after receipt 
of written notice from the selling party, accompanied by a copy of 
the duly executed contract of sale (See para. 5). 
N&HOGGAN y r 
*NEYS AT LAW 
fEST CENTER 
3 BOX 525 
sj UTAH 84321 
U 7 5 2 , r 5 1 
-16-
41. At the November 2, 1982 meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
whereat the Real Estate Contract was executed, it was observed 
that Carole Lake, who had notarized the Option, had failed to fill 
in the blank ("March , 1982") in the notary's paragraph of the 
original Option. Colman volunteered to have her correct this and 
referred to the omission as a simple oversight. Subsequently, Ms. 
Latce did fill in the blank with the number "1" and the Option was 
returned to Fillmore by Colman for recording with the Real Estate 
Contract, which recordings were effected in Cache County on 
December 20, 1982. 
42. After Archer and Wolfe received written notice from 
Miller's attorney, Fillmore, of Colman1s assignment of his Option 
rights to Plaintiff, Archer called Fillmore pn or about January 4, 
1983 and told Fillmore, among other things, that the $5,000.00 for 
the Option had never been paid by Colman. Nonetheless, Archer 
indicated that Defendants were still willing to sell the Anderson 
Ranch to Plaintiff if he would pay $655,000.00. 
43. During January and February of 1983, Archer, Wolfe and 
Fillmore engaged in negotiations for MilLer's purchase of the 
Anderson Ranch', but the sale was never consummated because the 
parties could not agree upon terms, and because Miller was seeking 
a guaranty from Colman that he would not exercise his rights 
under paragraph 4.a. in order to ensure that Miller would not 
incur substantial financing costs in vain. 
44. On April 8, 1983, the Defendants attempted to revoke the 
Option by a letter to Colman from the Defendants' prior attorney, 
Gregory P. Williams (Exhibit 15), wherein said attorney advised, 
based upon his clients' position that "no consideration was given 
for the Option", that "the offer has been withdrawn". 
45. On April 15, 1983, Colman, Allen, Plaintiff, Fillmore, 
John Miller and John Clay (an employee and financial adviser of 
N 8c HOGGAN 
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had represented previously as to the history and intent behind the 
Option given Colman by the Defendants, in light of Archer and 
Wolfe's position on the $5,000.00 and what appeared to be a 
probability of litigation over the same. Colman and Allen 
reaffirmed at that meeting to Plaintiff and his attorney and 
employees that the $5,000.00 was never intended to be paid, but 
was a number pulled out of the air by Allen as he prepared the 
documents; that Wolfe represented that he had full authority to 
sign the Option for his trust* and that the series of documented 
transactions (the Limited Partnership, the Contract, the Special 
Warranty Deed(s) and the Option), were all part of one, unified, 
integrated scheme which was basically intended to get $500,000.00 
to Colman for his salt project, secure the repayment of the same 
with the Anderson Ranch and guaranty Colman the right to reacquire 
the ranch upon his payback of the $500,000.00 plus a $150,000.00 
premium on the same, structured in a way to give Defendants 
additional incentives and secure certain tax benefits important to 
them -- all of which comprised the true consideration for the 
deal. Allen and Colman agreed to give Plaintiff their Affidavits 
to this effect. 
46. At the April 15, 1983 meeting in Salt Lake City, Colman 
also indicated his willingness, after consulting further with 
Allen, to sign a Waiver and Release similar to the one previously 
requested by Plaintiff in February, 1983 (See Exhibit 34), because 
Colman was m no position to purchase the Anderson Ranch before 
July 2, 1983 and wanted Miller to buy it so that he (Colman) could 
at least have a shot at acquiring a partial interest on or before 
July 2, 1984. 
47. On April 19, 1983, Colman signed a Waiver and Release 
for Miller's benefit, which Waiver and Release was subsequently 
recorded in Cache County on April 20, 1983 (Exhibit 10, 
si & HOGGAN 
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reacquire 100% of the Ranch, to exercise the Option and 
acquire the Anderson Ranch on or before July 2, 1983, thereby (a) 
guarantying Plaintiff, by Colman1s waiver of his paragraph 4.a. 
option rights, that Plaintiff, at the very least, would be the 
owner of 50% of the Anderson Ranch (even if Colman were to 
exercise his option under paragraph 4.b. subsequently), (b) 
eliminating the June 18, 1983 deadline for Miller's exercise of 
the Option, because Colman was not in a position to exercise his 
rights under the Option or the Real Estate Contract by July 2, 
1983., and he wanted Miller to do so, and (c) assuring Colman that 
he would later be able to exercise his 507o option reserved under 
paragraph 4.b. if he could come up with the money on or before 
July 2, 1984, because Miller's ownership of the ranch would then 
make the paragraph 4.b. option possible. This mutual intent is 
clearly refLected by the language contained in the Waiver and 
Release: (viz., "...which Waiver and Release is executed by the 
undersigned in order to induce said Ernest Junior Miller to 
exercise his rights under the aforesaid Real Estate Contract and 
purchase the subject property on or before July 2, 1983, without 
fear of any claim of right by William J. Colman to repurchase the 
same from Ernest J. Miller, except as to William J. Colman's 
reserved right to purchase up to a 50% interest in the subject 
property after July 2, 1983 and before July 2, 1984."). (Emphasis 
added.) 
48. Colman induced Miller to exercise the Option, making it 
clear that he had until July 2, 1983 to do so, for Colmanfs 
benefit as well as Miller's. Because Colman, at that point, had 
to rely on Miller's ability to purchase the ranch, he extended 
Miller's time to exercise the Option until July 2, 1983, and 
reserved only his right to reacquire up to 50% the next year. It 
would have been irrational, given his financial circumstances and 
his dependence on Miller's exercise, for Colman to arbitrarily 
(and against his own best interests) limit the time for Miller to 
exercise the Option. The purpose of the Waiver and Release was 
further corroborated by Colman1s subsequent conduct after its 
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execution (i.e., no objection) and by Miller's conduct in 
reliance thereon (i.e., its execution on July 1). The Court also 
notes that the Defendants were not parties to the Waiver and 
Release, nor were they privy to Coiman and Miller's intent 
regarding the same. 
49. No consideration is stated on the face of the Waiver an 
Release, but the Court finds from the testimony at trial that it 
was given by Coiman in exchange for Miller's assurance that he 
would exercise the Option, guarantying Coiman another year to 
acquire a partial interest in the ranch, and as additional 
consideration, for Miller's promise to Coiman that he would not 
have to pay interest on any exercise of his paragraph 4.b. option 
and that, in any event, Coiman would be entitled to use the 
property for recreational purposes for the r'est of his life. 
50. Following a review of two draft affidavits prepared by 
Fillmore, Allen prepared his own Affidavit (Exhibit 27), signed 
and had it notarized on April 29, 1983. Allen spent the better 
part of the morning on May 2, 1983 with Coiman, preparing and 
modifying his draft of Colman's Affidavit (Exhibit 28), which was 
reviewed and discussed by them paragraph-by-paragraph, amended by 
them, and then executed by Coiman and notarized by Allen's 
secretary, all on the same day. 
51. On April 18, 1983, Plaintiff called Archer and offered 
to pay $650,000.00 to the Defendants for the Anderson Ranch under 
the Option. Archer indicated that he would have to visit with 
Wolfe before responding. On April 20, 1983, Archer called Miller 
back and informed him of the Defendants' rejection of Miller's 
offer of $650,000.00 for the Anderson Ranch, indicating that 
Defendants did not want to sell the property. 
52. In April of 1983, Archer and Wolfe attempted to persuad 
Coiman to exercise his option rights under paragraph 4.a. of the 
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however that the Waiver and Release which Colman had signed 
for Miller's benefit made such an attempt to prevent Miller from 
acquiring the ranch illegal. 
53. On May 16, 1983. Plaintiff filed this action against the 
Defendants and a Lis Pendens against the Anderson Ranch. On June 
24. 1983, the Defendants filed their Answer. Defendants filed 
their Third-Party Complaint against Colman on June 30. 1983. and 
then filed their Amended Answer and Counterclaim against Plaintiff 
on July 1, 1983. 
54. On or about June 27 or 28, 1983, Fillmore called E. 
Craig Smay, of Salt Lake City, Utah, the Defendants1 attorney 
(hereinafter "Smay11), to determine the best way to make the formal 
tender of the $650,000.00 to the Defendants under the Option in 
the context of this pending litigation concerning the same 
property, the Option and the same parties. Inasmuch as Archer and 
Wolfe had rejected Miller's prior offer, and had expressly 
repudiated the Option in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint, 
all parties and their attorneys understood that Miller's tender of 
a casnier's check would not be accepted by the Defendants. 
Moreover, neither Archer nor Wolfe were in the State at the time. 
Archer admitted on the stand that he would not have accepted 
Plaintiff's tender of $650,000.00 on July 1, 1983 in any event. 
Fillmore and Smay determined that the best way to handle the 
matter would be to tender the $650,000.00 to the Defendants via 
the Court and then deposit the same upon endorsement in a 
Court-supervised, interest-bearing account. 
55. On July 1. 1983, Fillmore met with Smay at the latterfs 
office in Salt Lake City and tendered to Smay, as Defendants1 
attorney. Plaintiff's cashier's check to the Defendants for 
$650,000.00 (Exhibit 13), which money had been borrowed by 
Plaintiff, subject to interest charges. At said meeting the 
I&HOGGAN attorneys modified and signed a Delivery of Check and Motion and a 
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that same day filed said Delivery of Check and Motion and the 
Order with this Court and deposited the check with the Clerk of 
the Court. 
56. The language contained in Plaintiff1s Complaint, and in 
the Delivery of Check and Motion and the stipulated Order, and the 
verbal expressions of Fillmore to Smay on July 1, 1983, substan-
tially conformed with the tender language requirements of 
paragraph 3 of the Option. 
57. The Option was exercised on JuLy 1, 1983 by Plaintiff, 
without any- objection or protest being made by Colman to Plaintiff 
either before or since. 
58. The Option was exercised by Plaintiff according to its 
terms - i.e., the Option called for a tender of $650,000.00 on or 
before July 2, 1983, which requirements Plaintiff met precisely. 
The Defendants were in no way prejudiced by the date of 
Plaintiff's execise of the Option, inasmuch as they had already 
granted that much time to the original optionee. Moreover, the 
Defendants had already made it abundantly clear to Plaintiff, by 
virtue of their prior rejections, that they did not intend to 
accept any tender by Plaintiff regardless of when it might be 
made. 
59. Shortly thereafter, at Smay's suggestion, the parties 
through their attorneys entered into a Stipulation to replace the 
original check (Exhibit 13) with a new check (Exhibit 16) , so as 
to permit the deposit of the tendered funds, in the absence of the 
Defendants from the State, into an interest-bearing account. 
Pursuant to that Stipulation, $650,000.00 was subsequently 
deposited at First Interstate Bank, Logan Branch. In the Fall of 
1983, the deposited funds were invested in revolving monthly 
Certificates of Deposit at said bank, which arrangement continued 
until the time of trial. 
60. On July 2, 1984 Colman, Archer and Wolfe entered into a 
certain Agreement (Exhibit 33), whereby Colman, for $5,000.00, Mas 
further consideration for this agreement," agreed to convey to 
Archer and Wolfe a fifty percent (50%) .interest in Che Anderson 
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Ranch which he hoped to procure through an attempted exercise 
of his paragraph 4.b. option under the Real Estate Contract and 
whereby Archer and Wolfe agreed to permit Plaintiff to withdraw 
$364,000.00 from the Court-supervised savings account, as and for 
Colman's tender of that sum, to make possibLe Coimanfs exercise of 
the 4.b. option, with the express understanding that Coiman would 
deed said interest over to Archer and Wolfe upon his receipt of a 
deed from Miller. The Defendants and their attorney had 
previously received copies of the Real Estate Contract by way of 
Plaintiff's prior pleadings and the discovery herein. 
61. On July 2, 1984, a Notice from Coiman (Exhibit 31) and a 
Stipulation from the Defendants (Exhibit 32) was sejp/ed on John 
Clay, an officer of E. A. Miller & Sons Packing Co., <sr compan^^c^ 
effectively controlled by Plaintiff, advising Plaintiff that "^/ 
Defendants were willing to allow him to withdraw $364,000.00 from 
the Court-supervised account for purposes of Colman's exercise of 
the 4.b. option, which attempted exercise of the 4.b. option by 
Coiman (and Archer and Wolfe) was never accepted by Miller. 
62. Nonetheless, the funds in the Court-supervised account 
were not Colman's funds, nor were they the Defendants' funds ab-
sent their delivery of a deed to Plaintiff (See the terms of Exhi-
bit 14, paragraph 4), which they had not done. Moreover, if Mil-
ler had accepted such a tender on July 2, and withdrawn the funds, 
the withdrawal would have been subject to an early withdrawal 
penalty under the certificate of deposit (See Exhibit 60). 
63. Prior to Colman's (and the Defendants') attempted exer-
cise of the 4.b. option, neither Coiman nor Defendants had secured 
Plaintiff's prior written approval of any assignment of Colman's 
rights, as required by paragraph 4.f. of the Real Estate Contract, 
nor was there any prior verbal notice to or approval by Plaintiff. 
In fact, it appears that Defendants structured their deal in a 
deliberate manner to avoid the non-assignability clause. 
64. In connection with Colman's (and the Defendants1) 
attempted exercise of the 4.b. option, no recognition was ever 
given to Miller's first right of refusal. The Plaintiff was never 
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given written (or verbal) notice of the Agreement between 
Defendants and Colman, nor the sale terms thereof which he would 
have to meet, nor was he ever allowed to exercise his first right 
of refusal within thirty (30) days after receiving a copy of what 
should have been a conditional agreement between Colman and the 
Defendants, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract• 
Plaintiff did not learn of, or receive a copy of, the Agreement 
between the Defendants and Colman until the discovery of the same 
was compelled at Defendants' second depositions on September 27, 
1984. The Agreement between Colman and the Defendants 
unconditionally required Colman to convey to Defendants all his 
rights in the Anderson Ranch which he was to acquire pursuant to 
paragraph 4.b. of the Real Estate Contract. 
65. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any kind 
suggesting collusion or conspiracy between Colman and Plaintiff to 
defraud Defendants of their interests in the Anderson Ranch or 
regarding any damages suffered by Defendants related thereto, as 
alleged in their Amended Answer and Counterclaim. Indeed, 
Defendants introduced little, if any, evidence concerning these 
allegations. lr£zx!bSxSlJi!n^—arty^-r n IJCU^XOT^O^^^ — 
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66. The legal description of the Anderson Ranch contained in 
the Contract, the Option, the Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and 
Release and Plaintiff1s Complaint all contain an obvious 
scrivenor's error, referencing "Township 10 South'1, instead of the 
correct description, "Township 10 North", under Parcel 3. None of 
the parties herein are under any misconception as to which 
l&HOGGAN r J r 
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67. The Defendants have enjoyed possession and all rights of 
ownership of the Anderson Ranch since Plaintiff!s July 1, 1983 
tender of the $650,000.00. The Defendants have executed leases 
with third parties for the use of the Anderson Ranch, most recent-
ly with Boyd Munns, to run cattle on the ranch property. All 
rents paid under such leases have been received by the Defendants. 
68. In contrast to the Defendants, the Plaintiff has 
received no rents or income, nor has he had any other commercial 
benefit, from the Anderson Ranch since his tender of $650,000.00 
on July 1, 1983; nor has he had the use of his money since then. 
What limited and sporadic recreational use Plaintiff has had of 
the ranch has been without objection by the owners and similar to 
that enjoyed historically by many others in
 fthe area. 
69. The Defendants could have received the $650,000.00 
lodged in the Court-supervised savings account at any time after 
July 1, 1983 if they would have provided Plaintiff with a proper 
deed, but they have never delivered a deed to Plaintiff entitling 
them to said tender money. 
70. The Court finds no persuasive evidence of any collusion 
or conspiracy between Colman and Miller to defraud the Defendants 
out of their interests in the Anderson Ranch, as alleged by 
Defendants* in their Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
71. Exhibits 54,55 and 56 are notes made by Colman at or 
about the time of various conversations between Colman, Archer and 
Wolfe and should be admitted as evidence. Exhibit 28 is Colman1s 
Affidavit made prior to this litigation and is corroborative of 
the Court1s findings on various issues and should be admitted in 
evidence for all purposes. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1. This Court has in rem jurisdiction over the Anderson 
Ranch; personal jurisdiction over the Plaintiff, all the 
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Defendants and the Third-Party Defendant; and subject matter 
jurisdiction over those matters which have been brought before the 
Court by way of the parties' pleadings, including without 
limitation all matters affecting title to the Anderson Ranch as 
between the parties named herein. 
2. That the Real Estate Contract is valid and enforceable in 
all respects and that the Option granted by Archer and Wolfe to 
Colman is irrevocable, valid in all respects and is supported by a 
sufficient consideration. 
3. That the Option was fully assignable by Colman, was 
assigned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is the owner and holder of 
the Option. The Waiver and Release is a valid and enforceable 
agreement in all respects and extended to July 2, 1983 the time 
within which Miller should exercise the Optibn. 
4. That Plaintiff made a valid exercise of the Option under 
the circumstances and is entitled to a decree specifically 
enforcing the Option. 
5. Given the uniqueness of the Anderson Ranch property, 
money damages would be inadequate compensation to the Plaintiff 
for Defendants' repudiation of the Option. 
6. That Plaintiff has paid the purchase price provided in 
the Option by depositing the same with the Clerk of the Court and 
a decree should enter awarding the $650,000.00 so paid by 
Plaintiff to Defendants. 
7. That interest accrued on the $650,000.00 purchase price 
deposited with the Court is the property of Plaintiff and a decree 
should enter awarding Plaintiff all interest accrued on said 
$650,000.00 while in the custody of the Clerk of the Court. 
8. That a decree should enter correcting the scrivenors 
error describing Parcel 3 of the legal description in the Option, 
Real Estate Contract, the Waiver and Release, and Plaintiff's 
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Verified Complaint, to Township 10 North rather than Township 
10 South. 
9. Neither the Real Estate Contract or the rights and 
entitlements of Colman thereunder were assignable by Colman to any 
third party without Plaintiff's prior written consent, which 
consent was never sought nor given by Plaintiff. 
10. The first right of refusal granted to Miller by Colman 
under paragraph 5 of the Real Estate Contract was a valid, legal 
right vested in Miller and enforceable by him against Colman and 
any third party. 
11. The Waiver and Release was a valid and enforceable 
agreement between Colman and Plaintiff, was supported by adequate 
consideration and was intended to and did enable Plaintiff to 
it 
lawfully exercise the Option to purchase the Anderson Ranch on or 
before July 2, 1983. 
12. The attempted exercise of the paragraph 4.b. option 
under the Real Estate Contract by Colman (and Defendants) on Julv 
2, 1984 was an invalid exercise of that option right and is, 
therefore, void and of no effect. 
13. The said Warranty Deeds from Royalty Investment 
Corporation to Defendants on the Anderson Ranch effected a valid 
conveyance of the Anderson Ranch by Royalty Investment Corporation 
to Defendants. 
14. An order should enter admitting Exhibits- 28, 54, 55 and 
56 in ev 
15 
Plaintiff. 
16. Though the Court finds that the applicable burden of 
proof upon Plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence, the Court 
concludes that Plaintiff has sustained his burden of proving his 
claims against Defendants and Third-Party Defendants in this case 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
h t$~Zs D , DD 
Possession of the Anderson Ranch should bs^delivered to -f\ 
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17. Plaintiff's pleadings should be amended to conform in 
all respects to Plaintiff's theories, arguments and evidence 
presented at trial. 
LET JUDGMENT E^TER ACCORDINGLY#" 
DATED this ^] -^  day of.-i^^'"~1986. . — 
7 * / • r 
Omer J. Call 
District Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed an exact copy of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to Defendants1 Attorney, 
E. Craig Smay, at 208 Kearns Building, 136 South Main, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101; and to Third-Party Defendant, William J. Colman, 
at 1935 South Main, Suite 301, Salt Lake City, Utah 84105, postage 
prepaid in Logan, Utah, this day of July, 1986. 
^ / 
L. Brent Hoggan 
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